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The Macroeconomic Toll of Genocide and 
the Sources of Economic Development
Di m i t r io s  S ou di s ,  R ob e r t  I n k l a a r ,  a n d  R ob b e r t  M a s e l a n d
5.1. Introduction
The costs of conflict and mass killings are not limited to the immediate victims 
of the violence. Episodes of violent conflict also have severe consequences for the 
survivors, part of which is in lost economic output. In the short term, civil con-
flict is bad for the economic growth of afflicted countries (Collier 1999; Koubi 
2005), and these negative effects can spill over to contingent states (De Groot 
2010). After peace, some of the immediate negative effects of conflict disappear 
and countries may find themselves in a recovery process, with higher than normal 
growth rates (Organski and Kugler 1977; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Koubi 
2005). Others, though, have questioned whether economic activity recovers from 
its initial fall (Mueller 2012). Conflict may cause permanent damage to a coun-
try’s social or physical infrastructure, so that it continues to experience adverse 
consequences long after the termination of the conflict itself (Ghobarah, Huth, 
and Russett 2003; Hoeffler and Reynal- Querol 2003).
Genocides have received much less attention than other types of conflict. 
They are generally treated as separate events in the literature (Sambanis 2004) or 
even as mere consequences of civil wars (Krain 1997; Stewart 2011). Yet, there is 
ample reason to expect the economic consequences of genocides to be worthy of 
independent analysis. First, genocides are characterized by a higher intensity of 
violence that is more explicitly directed at the civilian population and its liveli-
hood. This results in a relatively higher loss of lives and thus of human capital, but 
a possibly lower degree of destruction of physical capital. Since a loss of physi-
cal capital is easier to restore than losses in human capital, genocides are likely 
to have more persistent negative effects and may generate less swift recoveries 
than nongenocidal conflicts. Second, genocides may have different economic 
effects through their impact on trust and the formal and informal institutions 
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underlying cooperation. Genocides are likely to be more divisive and tear up 
the social fabric of society more completely than other forms of violent conflict. 
Ethnic and communal violence may increase the degree of trust within the in- 
group, at the expense of trust in out- groups. The resulting damage to social infra-
structure increases transaction costs, reducing the scope for impersonal exchange 
and worsening allocative efficiency (Wallis 2011).
Given the differences between genocides and other forms of conflict, there is 
good reason to investigate genocides more systematically. This chapter does so by 
providing a broad, cross- country empirical investigation. Thus, we aim to answer 
the question of how genocides and mass political killings (henceforth both events 
will be referred to as “genocides”) affect economic outcomes. Extant genocide lit-
erature mainly uses economic variables to predict or explain the occurrence of 
genocide, although empirical support for this relationship is weak at best (Stewart 
2011). There is not much work on the opposite relation: Do genocides affect eco-
nomic outcomes and, if so, how? What is more, the few studies that have addressed 
this question focus on the Rwandan case, which might not be representative of 
genocides in general. At the macro level, Lopez and Wodon (2005) argue that 
Rwanda’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) levels would have been 25 to 
30 percent higher had the genocide of 1994 not happened. On the individual level, 
Serneels and Verpoorten (2013) argue that, six years after the Rwandan genocide, 
households that experienced more violence are lagging behind in terms of con-
sumption. However, Rogall and Yanagizawa- Drott (2013) find the exact opposite 
result. The conflicting and country- specific evidence suggests there is a clear need 
for more systematic analysis.
We provide such an analysis by combining data from the newly released version 
8.0 of the Penn World Table (PWT; see Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015) and 
the Political Instability Task Force (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2014)  data on 
genocides and politicides, creating a dataset covering thirty- five episodes of geno-
cide in twenty- three countries. Our two goals are, first, to distinguish between 
the short- term and long- term effects of genocides on economic outcomes; and, 
second, to determine whether any negative effects on GDP can be traced to 
decreases in capital or decreases in productivity.
Given the broader literature on the effects of conflicts on economies, it could 
be that (1)  genocides have only a transitory negative effect on economic activ-
ity, as a short- term decline is compensated by a longer- term recovery; (2) geno-
cides have a permanent adverse effect on the level of economic activity, and while 
growth subsequently resumes on its old path, it thereby does not catch up to its 
pregenocide trend level; or (3)  genocide leads to a permanently lower growth 
path. To distinguish among these three scenarios, we follow the methodology 
of Cerra and Saxena (2008) and estimate an autoregressive (AR) model for eco-
nomic outcomes and a variable indicating when genocide starts. Using impulse 
response functions (IRFs), we show that economic activity follows scenario (2): It 
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declines sharply at the start of a genocide and does not subsequently recover this 
lost ground— a result in line with the findings for civil wars in Mueller (2012).
Furthermore, we find that the reduction in GDP per worker can be traced to a 
decline in productivity, not to a decline in physical capital per worker. This leads 
us to conclude that the start of genocide results in a significant disruption of the 
economic process in the afflicted countries— leading to a permanent drop in the 
level of productivity compared to a scenario without genocide— but not a long- 
run destruction of growth potential. We note, though, that this is not a statement 
of causality as we cannot rule out that genocide has its roots (partly) in economic 
circumstances.
5.2. How Genocides May Effect 
Economic Outcomes
Apart from their costs in terms of human suffering, genocides are likely to bring 
about serious economic costs. A broad literature has documented the economic 
effects of civil wars and conflicts, showing that civil conflict does considerable 
contemporary harm to the economy (Collier 1999; Abadie and Gardeazabal 
2003; Hoeffler and Reynal- Querol 2003; Koubi 2005; Lopez and Wodon 2005; 
De Groot 2010; Serneels and Verpoorten 2013). Collier (1999) identifies three 
main channels through which civil conflict may affect economic growth. First, 
civil war may directly destroy capital, cause capital flight, and reduce savings, 
eroding a country’s capital stock. Second, militarization and increased security 
expenses imply that resources are diverted from productive activities toward 
nonproductive activities, resulting in a lower factor of productivity. Third, higher 
transaction and transport costs due to disruption of social and physical infra-
structure and the undermining of the state may result in a less efficient allocation 
of productive factors (Collier 1999).
To formalize how these channels may be distinguished (in part), it is helpful 
to consider a growth- accounting decomposition. This decomposition is origi-
nally attributed to Solow (1957) (see Hulten [2010] for a comprehensive and 
modern survey). Assume that the output of an economy, Y, is produced using 
capital, K, labor, L, and with productivity level, A, in a Cobb- Douglas produc-
tion function:
= −Y AK L .α α1  (1)
The output of an economy is its level of GDP, the capital stock consists of cumu-
lated past investments in buildings and machinery, labor is the number of work-
ers in the economy, α is the output elasticity of capital, and productivity is the 
efficiency with which capital and labor are combined into output. This concept 
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of productivity is usually referred to as total factor productivity (TFP). Equation 
(1) can be expressed in terms of growth rates of output per worker y ≡ Y ∕ L as:
= +y α k AΔ log  Δ log Δ log , (2)
where k ≡ K ∕ L. This implies that the growth of GDP per worker, Δ log y, on the 
left- hand side of equation (2) can be expressed as the contribution from changes 
in the capital stock per worker plus TFP growth on the right- hand side. In the 
original work by Solow (1957), TFP growth was given the interpretation of tech-
nological change, but this interpretation relies on strict assumptions such as 
perfect competition. More generally, TFP growth is computed as a residual; and 
Hulten (2010) discusses that TFP growth can reflect much more, including the 
efficiency of resource allocation (see also Fernald and Neiman [2011] more spe-
cifically on this point). Indeed, the fact that TFP is measured as a residual means 
that we can empirically distinguish only the effect of genocide on the capital/ 
labor ratio (k) from the effect on all other factors influencing economic activity.
Seen through this lens, all three channels identified by Collier (1999) imply 
that economic activity is negatively affected by conflict; but in the case of direct 
destruction (the first channel), this is because the input of capital is reduced. In 
the case of the other two channels— militarization and security spending, and 
transaction and transport costs— the effect would be seen in the country’s pro-
ductivity. The shift toward military activities and/ or higher transaction costs and 
social, institutional, and physical disruption would lead to a less efficient use of a 
given set of inputs, and so result in a reduction in TFP, the second component on 
the right- hand side of equation (2).
Leaving aside the precise channels, it seems safe to conclude that there is a 
net negative contemporaneous effect of civil conflict on the economy. However, 
the longer- term effects are more hotly debated (Cerra and Saxena 2008; Chen, 
Loayza, and Reynal- Querol 2008; Voors et  al. 2012). Collier (1999) maintains 
that the main harm done through capital flight and dissaving is reversible once 
peace is restored. In his argument, agents respond to the fall in productivity from 
disruption during a conflict by moving capital out of the country. When the con-
flict’s immediate negative effect on productivity is lifted, the resulting lack of 
capital in postconflict economies makes returns on investment relatively high. 
A recovery phase may set in, with temporarily higher growth rates. The occur-
rence of such a recovery phase depends on the duration of the conflict, however. If 
a conflict constitutes a short, negative shock to the economy, the economy has not 
yet completely adjusted to the conflict- time equilibrium when peace is restored. If 
the war is long, there is a higher chance of seeing a recovery, as all negative adjust-
ments have been made and the economy can begin anew. Studying the effects of 
the long- running conflict in the Basque region of Spain, Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003) indeed find empirical support for a recovery after a truce is called.
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Others have argued that conflicts continue to do harm long after the fighting 
has stopped, in terms of both casualties and economic costs (Ghobarah, Huth, 
and Russett 2003; Hoeffler and Reynal- Querol 2003). Part of the reason is that 
while the destruction and diversion of capital associated with violent conflict may 
have ended, the damage done to a country’s social infrastructure and to the legiti-
macy and effectiveness of the state may be permanent. The ethnic nature of vio-
lence in genocides is especially likely to do lasting harm to social ties, trust, and 
institutions (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013; Bauer et al. 2014). This matters 
because the decline in institutions that facilitate interactions between individuals 
and groups in the economy erodes the potential for cooperation, exchange, and 
specialization, with adverse economic consequences (North 1990; Putnam 1993; 
Easterly 2001; Wallis 2011). Indeed, a recurrent result in the empirical growth 
literature is that past shocks to institutional quality often have enduring effects on 
future economic performance (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008; Nunn 2009; 
Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013). There is also increasing evidence that violent con-
flict may change the preferences of individuals, inducing them to become more 
risk- seeking and developing higher discount rates, thus pushing down savings 
rates permanently (Voors et al. 2012; Bauer et al. 2014; Callen et al. 2014). For 
these reasons, the economic damage done by conflict may not be easily restored. 
If the erosion of institutions and social capital affects the potential for adaptation 
and innovation, it may even set economies on a permanently lowered growth path.
Genocidal conflicts may be particularly prone to have such long- term effects. 
Aimed less at harming an opponent’s fighting capacity and more at eliminating 
entire segments of the civilian population, the effects of genocides on physical 
capital may be relatively limited compared to regular violent conflict, while the 
costs in terms of human capital are relatively high (Serneels and Verpoorten 
2013). As a consequence, genocides may have more persistent income effects. The 
ethnic or communal component of most genocides is also likely to do particular 
harm to societal institutions and social capital. For these reasons, we expect geno-
cides to have stronger long- term effects on productivity and output.
On the basis of the arguments discussed here, we identify three possible sce-
narios for growth after genocide (see Figure 5.1). The first is a recovery scenario 
(left- hand panel), wherein the decline in productivity and output occurring dur-
ing genocide is only temporary, and societies bounce back to the previous growth 
trajectory after peace is restored. In this scenario, genocides have the same effects 
as mild civil conflicts, causing contemporary diversion and destruction during 
the conflict itself but doing no permanent damage to the economy.
The second scenario (middle panel) is that of a onetime permanent drop in 
productivity levels, with no changes in subsequent growth rates but without ever 
catching up to the prior trend line of economic growth. This may be due to last-
ing damage to institutions and social capital, causing a reduction in allocative 
efficiency.
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Scenario three (right- hand panel) is the one in which genocides set societies on 
a permanently lower growth path. Adverse effects of genocides on savings rates, 
innovation, and adaptive efficiency of a society’s institutions may cause such 
long- term effects. The aim of our empirical analysis is to determine which of these 
scenarios best fits the economic experience of countries that have experienced 
genocide.
5.3. Data and Methods
To quantify the effect of genocide on economic performance, we combine three 
datasets. Our economic variables come from the PWT, version 8.0, covering 
167 countries between 1950 and 2011 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). 
We calculate the annual growth rate of GDP per worker for each country and 
decompose it into the growth of physical capital per worker, plus the growth 
in TFP, using the growth accounting decomposition on the right- hand side of 
equation (2). The PWT also provides its own growth accounting decomposition 
(see Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015), but coverage of countries is incomplete 
due to missing data on human capital and capital income shares. We therefore use 
the average capital share as our estimate of α, used to weight the growth of (physi-
cal) capital per worker and construct TFP growth as a residual. We use all three 
indicators as dependent variables in order to identify the channel through which 
genocides affect growth.
While these three indicators provide a more detailed view of the economic 
consequences of genocide, they are not without limitations. In general, data 
collected in a turbulent period may be subject to greater measurement error, 
although without a bias in a specific direction this will only make it harder to draw 
any type of statistically valid conclusion. It could be that demographic informa-
tion, and thus data on the number of workers that we use to scale GDP and capital, 
is particularly less reliable around genocide (on the demography of genocide, see 











Figure 5.1 Growth after genocide— possible scenarios. 
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A final remark on the growth data concerns the data on capital. The capital data 
from the PWT are based on accumulated and depreciated past investment, which 
means that direct destruction of capital is not measured. The impact of such 
destruction will be apparent in TFP growth, since that is measured as a residual. 
However, destruction of capital would, ceteris paribus, raise the marginal pro-
ductivity of new investments and stimulate faster growth in capital in the future. 
This would show up as a delayed positive effect of genocide on capital per worker 
growth and would, in principle, be captured by our analysis.
Our genocide indicator comes from the Genocide and Politicide Problem 
Set produced by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The PITF provides 
annual information on genocides and politicides for all countries with a total pop-
ulation of 500,000 or greater, covering the period from 1955 to 2011. (On geno-
cide and mass atrocity data generally, see  chapter 3 in this volume.) Genocides in 
our study “involve the promotion, execution, and/ or implied consent of sustained 
policies by governing elites or their agents or in the case of civil war, either of the 
contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a com-
munal group or politicized non- communal group” (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 
2014, 14). The victimized groups are defined both in terms of their communal 
(ethnolinguistic, religious) characteristics (in the case of genocides) as well as 
their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups (for politicides). The 
PITF dataset covers 35 episodes of genocide across 23 countries with a median 
length of 5.5 years.
Our estimation is based on the approach used by Cerra and Saxena (2008). 
We use an autoregressive distributed lag model to estimate the effects of genocide 
on our three dependent variables and subsequently construct IRFs to represent 
these effects graphically. In particular we estimate:






where zit is one of the three measures of economic outcomes for country i at time 
t (i.e., Δ log yit Δ log kit, or Δ log Ait) and G is an indicator coding whether a geno-
cide started in year t in country i. As argued by Mueller (2012), this start- year coding 
makes it possible to correctly assess the economic impact of a genocide (or other con-
flict), in contrast with coding all years in an episode as in Cerra and Saxena (2008). 
Our choice of lag- length is based on the statistical significance of the lagged coef-
ficients of the dependent variables; after the third lag, none of the coefficients reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance. The IRFs are graphed together with a 
95 percent confidence interval based on the results of 1,000 bootstrapped samples.
This empirical strategy is well suited to identify not only the initial effect of 
genocide but also to trace its dynamic impact on the economy. However, it does 
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not say anything about causality. We effectively have to assume that genocide 
starts at a random point in time and then, having started, we can determine how 
the economy evolves. It could, of course, be the case that genocide has (in part) 
roots in previous economic developments— although Stewart (2011) finds no 
clear evidence of this— and in that case our estimates will be biased. Our analysis 
can thus best be compared with event studies in finance: Given the start of geno-
cide, how does the economy evolve in subsequent years?
5.4. Results
Table 5.1 shows summary statistics for the three growth indicators for our main 
sample of 23 countries that experienced genocide and, for reference, the statistics 
for all 167 countries in the PWT. Moreover, the statistics for countries that expe-
rienced genocide are split between periods— when there was genocide, and when 
there was not (see Table 5.3 for the list of genocide countries and periods). In 
nongenocidal years, genocide countries experience, on average, somewhat higher 
growth in GDP per worker than the average PWT country— namely, 2.7 percent 
average annual growth versus 1.9  percent— and correspondingly faster growth 
in capital per worker (2.6 versus 2.2 percent) and faster TFP growth (1.5 versus 
0.9  percent). However, this changes drastically when focusing on the genocide 
years: growth in GDP per worker is – 0.3 percent on average, growth in capital per 
worker is only 1.9 percent, and TFP growth is – 1.2 percent. Note, though, that 
variation around the average growth rates tends be higher in genocide countries 
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics for Growth
Genocide Countries All Countries
Growth in: Nongenocidal 
Period
Genocidal Period
GDP per worker 0.027 (0.082) – 
0.003
(0.088) 0.019 (0.063)
Capital per worker 0.026 (0.062) – 0.019 (0.045) 0.022 (0.043)
Total factor 
productivity
0.015 (0.073) – 
0.012
(0.084) 0.009 (0.058)
No. of observations 861 204 7,026
Notes: The table shows average growth, with the standard deviation in parentheses. Statistics 
for “genocide countries” are based on data from PWT (version 8.0) for the 23 countries that 
experienced genocide since 1955 (see Table 5.3), with genocidal period(s) as shown in Table 5.3. 
Statistics for “all countries” cover all 167 countries in the PWT.
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than in nongenocide countries, and observations for all countries and years are 
simply lumped together. So while these summary statistics are surely suggestive 
of sharply lower growth during genocides, a formal analysis is needed to more 
firmly establish any effect.
We present the results from the estimation of equation (3) in the form of cumu-
lative impulse responses. Figure 5.2 depicts the effect of the start of genocide on 
the growth of GDP per worker and its constitutive parts. The left panel shows 
that in the first three years after the start of genocide, GDP per worker declines, 
on average, by 9.7 percent. This decline is statistically significant, as indicated by 
the 95  percent confidence interval, although the broad- width confidence inter-
val could indicate that there is considerable variation in the impact of genocides 
across countries. After the initial decline, there is very little change in the cumula-
tive response function, indicating that the loss in the level of GDP per worker is 
not recovered in subsequent years. This outcome is consistent with Scenario 2 in 
Figure 5.1, as Scenario 1 would imply a total recovery from the negative shock of 
genocide; while for Scenario 3, the cumulative effect should continue to decline. 
This impulse response function (IRF) is estimated based on changes in GDP per 
worker, to match the concept in the growth accounting framework, but we have 
also estimated the same model on changes in the level of GDP per se. The result-
ing IRF matches the IRF for GDP per worker quite closely, as shown in Figure 5.3.
Next, we look at the effects of genocide on the growth of capital per worker and 
on TFP. Starting with the latter, the IRF for TFP is essentially identical to that for 
0
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Years since start genocide
Figure 5.2 The effect of the start of genocide on GDP per worker and its constituent 
parts. Notes: Impulse response functions (solid lines) represent GDP/ worker growth and its 
constituent parts. The vertical axis shows the cumulative effect on growth, while the horizontal axis 
indicates the number of years since the start of genocide. Dashed lines show 95 percent confidence 
intervals.
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GDP per worker, with a negative cumulative effect after three years of 9.5 percent. 
In contrast, the confidence interval in the IRF for physical capital is on both sides 
of zero, indicating no statistically significant effect for the start of genocide on 
capital per worker. As discussed before, our measure of capital is accumulated 
and depreciated past investment and does not take into account any physical 
destruction. However, physical destruction would, under normal circumstances, 
increase the marginal product of capital and thus stimulate investment. As a 
result, capital would increase with some lag following any physical destruction 
unless a perfectly countervailing decline in TFP would reduce the marginal prod-
uct of capital to remove the incentive to invest. So our finding— that there is no 
effect on capital— suggests that physical destruction alone cannot account for the 
decline in GDP. If there were significant physical destruction, it would have to be 
in fine balance with the loss of TFP, since there is no significantly higher or lower 
investment with a lag.
To check on the robustness of these results and to understand whether vari-
ables such as the duration of genocide or its intensity— as measured by the num-
ber of deaths as a percentage of the population— have a moderating effect on the 
severity of the economic impact, we repeat the previous estimation exercises 
using subsamples of the data. In particular, we calculate the median duration of 
genocide (in years) and the median magnitude of deaths and estimate IRFs for the 




















0 2 4 6 8 10
Years since start genocide
Figure 5.3 The effect of the start of genocide on GDP. Notes: Impulse response functions 
represent growth in GDP (solid lines). The vertical axis shows the cumulative effect on growth, while the 
horizontal axis indicates the number of years since the start of genocide. Dashed lines show 95 percent 
confidence intervals.
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the main results for GDP per worker, with the short- run effect in the first year 
after the start of genocide and the long- run effect ten years after the start of geno-
cide. As the table shows, the short- run effects are all very similar, with a decline in 
GDP per worker of approximately 4.5 percent. There is more variation in the long- 
run effects, with the point estimates showing a decline of 13.4 percent for geno-
cides with above- median deaths and a decline of 6.7 percent in genocides with 
below- median deaths. Likewise, in genocides with duration above the median of 
5.5 years, the long- run effect is larger, with a 16 percent decline, than is the nega-
tive effect in briefer genocides of 5.7 percent. However, the smaller sample size of 
genocides in these subsamples means that it is harder to draw statistically signifi-
cant contrasts between these effects.
Our results should be interpreted with caution since it is empirically not fea-
sible to separate the effects of genocide from civil war. Table 5.3 presents the 
episodes of genocide in our dataset where, in the last column, we show the num-
ber of genocide years that overlapped with a civil war. In our sample there are 
only two countries (Ethiopia and Cambodia) where the two crises do not over-
lap. On average, about 60 percent of country- year episodes of genocide overlap 
with a civil war. Those that do not most often take place before, after, or between 
recurring episodes of civil war. Controlling for civil war and estimating condi-
tional IRFs does not change the results presented above, but we do not want to 
claim that this empirical strategy fully disentangles the effects of the two types 
of conflict.
Table 5.2 The Effect of Genocide on Growth of GDP per Worker in the Short 
Run and Long Run by Genocide Characteristics
Short Run (Year 1) Long Run (Year 10) Leveling off
All Genocides – 0.043 (– 0.076, – 
0.006)





– 0.047 (– 0.126, – 
0.033)





– 0.044 (– 0.067, – 
0.021)





– 0.045 (– 0.102, – 
0.005)





– 0.045 (– 0.062, – 
0.000)
– 0.160 (– 0.285, – 
0.044)
Yes
Notes: The table shows the effects of genocide on the growth of GDP per worker at Years 1 and 
10 (as well as the 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses), using the IRF estimates obtained 
by equation (3) estimated on subsamples, split by the median death toll and by the median dura-
tion of a genocide.
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Similarly, it is very difficult to establish through what channel(s) TFP growth 
is reduced. One prominent potential channel is a decrease in the degree of trust 
within society or even a broader loss of social capital. However, systematic time- 
varying data is not available to test this. There is more information about political 
institutions that might serve as a proxy for their capacity to exchange and work 
Table 5.3 Genocidal Episodes and Overlap with Civil Wars
Country Genocidal Period Duration Civil War 
Overlap (no. of 
years)
Angola 1975– 1994, 1998– 2002 25 7
Argentina 1976– 1980 5 2
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
1992– 1995 4 3
Burundi 1965– 1973, 1988, 1993 11 1
Cambodia 1975– 1979 5 No
Chile 1973– 1976 4 1
China 1959, 1966– 1975 11 1
Congo (Dem. 
Republic)
1963, 1965, 1977– 1979 5 No data
El Salvador 1980– 1989 10 10
Equatorial Guinea 1969– 1979 11 1
Ethiopia 1976– 1978 4 No
Guatemala 1978– 1990 13 13
Indonesia 1965– 1966, 1975– 1992 20 19
Iran 1981– 1992 12 11
Iraq 1964– 1975, 1988– 1991 17 15
Nigeria 1967– 1970 4 4
Pakistan 1971, 1973– 1977 6 5
Philippines 1972– 1976 5 5
Rwanda 1963– 1964, 1994 3 1
Sri Lanka 1989– 1990, 2008– 2009 15 2
Sudan 1956– 1972, 1983– 2011 46 No data
Syria 1981– 1982 2 2
Uganda 1971– 1986 16 9
Source: Data from Political Instability Task Force (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2014).
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together with other parts of society. In particular, data on the competitiveness 
of the political environment— that is, whether executives are openly recruited as 
opposed to whether there is an elite that rules over the state— may provide rel-
evant information (data from Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014). However, in our 
sample of twenty- three countries, only five experienced a reduction in political 
competitiveness at or around the time of genocide. This small sample size pre-
vents us from testing the proposed relationship.
Summing up our results, genocides act as a negative shock to the growth path 
of afflicted countries through the effects they have on productivity. This has a 
permanent negative effect on the level of economic activity and productivity; the 
growth rates do return to their previous path, but at a lower level of GDP than 
before.
5.5. Concluding Remarks
Genocides are not just atrocious events that exact a great toll of human suffer-
ing, but they also have a negative effect on economic activity. We find that in the 
first three years after the start of genocide, GDP per worker decreases by about 
10 percent. In contrast to civil wars, where somewhat smaller effects disappear 
over the long run, this negative effect of genocide on the economy persists for ten 
or more years. Some of the initial economic damage of violent conflicts is subse-
quently restored, but for genocides this apparently is an incomplete process. We 
present evidence that the income reduction is primarily caused by a reduction in 
TFP, that is, the efficiency with which production factors are used in the econ-
omy. Production factors per se are much less affected, economically speaking. All 
these results are in line with the interpretation that genocide typically tears social 
bonds in society and harms social capital in a more pervasive fashion than does 
civil war, thereby reducing allocative efficiency.
Some caveats are in order. First, although our results fit an erosion of social 
capital narrative, direct proof that the reduction in TFP growth is attributable to a 
reduction in social capital cannot be provided because of lack of data. Reliable his-
torical information on trust and social capital is not available. Second, while our 
analysis focuses on a systematic assessment of the economic effects of genocide 
in general, we acknowledge that each episode of genocide is a historically unique 
event. Economic impacts are likely to vary accordingly. The fact that our figure for 
the economic costs of genocides differs substantially from the reduction of 25 to 
30 percent found by Lopez and Wodon (2005) for the Rwandan genocide attests 
to this. Genocides differ on dimensions such as the number of people affected, 
their geographic concentration, their duration and intensity, and their political 
outcome. However, while genocides may not be rare (see  chapter 3), there are still 
too few of them to allow for a systematic analysis of the effect of these differences 
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on economic outcomes. Third, as indicated, our analysis of the economic damage 
associated with genocide should not be read as a statement on causality. Although 
evidence points to the contrary (Stewart 2011), we cannot rule out that genocide 
has its roots (partly) in economic circumstances. (For literature reviews on eco-
nomic correlates, causes, and consequences of genocide, see  chapters 9, 10, and 
24 in this volume.)
These caveats notwithstanding, the results presented in this chapter strongly 
contribute to the view that genocides carry serious economic consequences that 
go beyond those of “regular” civil wars. The finding of lasting negative effects 
makes the avoidance of genocide even more important and suggests that poli-
cies after genocide should be firmly focused on restoring some of the broken ties 
between communities.
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